Metaphysics
Readings marked with a * are particularly important. Those marked with a ! are ones that I find interesting.
- Causation
- Personal Identity
- Free Will
- Persistence over time
- Time
- Composition of objects
- Particulars and Universals
- Modality: (a) Necessity and (b) Possibility
- Truth
- Realism and Anti-Realism
- Identity and individuation
- Supervenience
Collections and Introductions
P. van Inwangen and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998)] Below: The Big Questions
Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: OUP, 2003) Below: Oxford Metaphysics
Crane, T., and K. Farkas. eds. 2004. Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Below: Metaphysics A Guide
Topics:
Introductory
*Hume, D., Treatise of Human Nature, [bk I, pt III, §§ ii & xiv.] Reprinted in The Big Questions
Crane, Tim. 1995. ‘Causation'. In A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. (Elementary introduction)
Jonathan Schaffer, 2003, ‘The Metaphysics of Causation' SEOP
(An advanced introduction, but nonetheless extremely clear)
Different accounts of causation
*Mackie, J. L., The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). [chs. 1, 2]
*Lewis, D., 'Causation', Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), 556-567. Reprinted in Sosa and Tooley below.
Anscombe, GEM, 'Causality and Determination', in Sosa and Tooley (below) and in The Big Questions
Sosa, E. and M.Tooley, eds, Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) (Read the introduction to get an idea of the different positions that the contributors take)
Schaffer, Jonathan, 2000. ‘Trumping Preemption', Journal of Philosophy, 97: 165-81.
(More difficult, regarding Lewis' theory)
*Parfit, D. 1971. ‘Personal Identity'. Philosophical Review 80: 3-27. Online Reprinted in J. Glover, ed., The Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976; and in Honderich, and M. Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979
*Johnston, M., 1987, ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83 Online
*Williams, B., 1970, ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review 79: 161-180, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge University Press, 1973) Online
Lewis, D. 1983. ‘Survival & Identity'. In his Philosophical Papers. Vol.1. New York: Oxford University Press Online
Parfit, D. 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press Section 3 Online
Shoemaker, Sydney, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell
Swinburne, R., 1984, ‘Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell
Zimmerman, D., 1998, ‘Criteria of Identity and the "Identity Mystics"’, Erkenntnis 48, 281–301 Online
Questions: Could I survive through there being a person in the future who lacks my body but has all my memories, personality, projects and character? [London 2006]
*David Lewis, 1986. Selection from On the Plurality of Worlds in Metaphysics A Guide and The Big Questions
One of the next two:
*Kurtz, Roxanne Marie, 2006, "What’s the Problem?: Introduction to Persistence" in Persistence: Contemporary Readings (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press) Online
*Haslanger, Sally, 2003, "Persistence through time" in Oxford Metaphysics Online
Then Haslanger and Heller:
Endurance
*!Haslanger, Sally, 1989, "Persistence, Change and Explanation", Philosophical Studies 56: 1-28 Online
!Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1983, "Parthood and Identity Across Time", Journal of Philosophy, 80: 201-20 Online
Perdurance
*Heller, Mark. 1984. ‘Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects', Philosophical Studies 46: 323-334 Online
!Sider, Ted, 1997, 'Four Dimensionalism', Philosophical Review 106 : 197-231 Online
Stage Theory
Sider, Theodore, 1996, "All the World's a Stage", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433-453 Online
Sider, Ted (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapters 1,3 Online
Hawley, Katherine, 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Mixed
!Johnston, M. 1987. ‘Is there a Problem about Persistence?'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61: 107-135.
Overview (save for revision/problems)
Hawley, Katherine, "Temporal Parts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Essay: Define "Endurance" and "Perdurance".
Then: How can we best accommodate our intuitions about how objects persist over time?
or
What is the problem of persistence? What is the best solution?
*Markosian, Ned, "Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Sections 4 and 5
*Markosian, Ned, “How Fast Does Time Pass?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53(1993), pp. 829-844 Online
*Smart, J.J.C., “The River of Time,” Mind 58 (1949), pp. 483-494 (reprinted in Flew, Antony (ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis (St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 213-227) Online
*Prior, A. N. 1962. ‘Changes in Events and Changes in Things'. In LePoidevin & MacBeath
Le Poidevin, Robin, and McBeath, Murray (eds.), The Philosophy of Time (Oxford University Press, 1993). [Quite a few copies in the library]
Godfrey-Smith, Peter, “Special Relativity and the Present,” Philosophical Studies 36 (1979). pp. 233-244 Online
Hinchliff, Mark, “The Puzzle of Change,” in Tomberlin, James (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 10, Metaphysics (Blackwell, 1996), pp. 119-136 [ref34]
Williams, Donald C., “The Myth of Passage,” Journal of Philosophy 48 (1951), pp. 457-472 [ref35]
Essay titles: Could there be time without change?
vii. Particulars and Universals
viii. Modality
*Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell:Oxford), Chapter 1
*Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1974. “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs 8: 211-231. Online
*Stalnaker, Robert. 1976. “Possible Worlds”, Noûs 10: 65-75 Online
Then Pick what you fancy from the following:
Hawthorne, John (O'Leary). “The Epistemology of Possible Worlds: A Guided Tour”, Philosophical Studies 84: 283-302 Online
Melia, Joseph. 2001. 'Reducing Possibilities to Language' Analysis, 61, 19–29 Online
Rosen, Gideon. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism”, Mind 99: 327-354 Online
Bricker, Phillip. 1987. “Reducing Possible Worlds to Language”, Philosophical Studies 52: 331-355. Online
Bricker, Phillip. 2007. "Concrete Possible Worlds" in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J. Hawthorne, T. Sider, and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Blackwell Publishing Online
Hymers, Michael. 1991. “Something Less Than Paradise: The Magic of Modal Realism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 251-263 Online
Essay question: What is the best account of possibility?
xi. Identity and individuation
*!Johnston, Mark. (1992). 'Constitution Is Not Identity', Mind 101: 89-105. Online
*Wiggins, D. (1968). 'On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time'. Philosophical Review 77: 90-95. Online
*Haslanger, Sally (1989). "Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics." Analysis 49:119–25
*Hawley, Katherine (1999). "Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations." Mind 108: 53–67 Online
Sider, Ted (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 5 Online
Fine, Kit. (2003). ‘The Non-identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter', Mind 112: 195-234 Online
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1997). 'Why Constitution is Not Identity.' Journal of Philosophy 94: 599–621. Online
Essays titles: Is a statue the same thing as the lump of clay it is composed of?
*Kim, Jaegwon. 1984. ‘Concepts of Supervenience'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:153-176. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 Online
*!Stalnaker, Robert, 1996. 'Varieties of Supervenience', Noûs, Vol. 30, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, pp. 221-241 Online or here. Also reprinted in Ways a World Might Be
*Papineau, David. 2002. Thinking about Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 Online
Horgan, Terence 1993. “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World,” Mind 102: 555-86 Online
Wilson, Jessica M. (1999). "How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?" Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):33-52 Online
Miller, Richard B., "Supervenience is a two way street" The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 12. (Dec., 1990), pp. 695-701 Online
MacKinnon J, "Aesthetic supervenience: for and against", British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 41, Number 1, January 2001 , pp. 59-75(17) Online
Bennett, Karren and McGlaughlin, Brian, (2005), "Supervenience", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry. See especially Section 3.
Essay: Define Supervenience, Global, Local, Strong and Weak Supervenience. Is the concept of Supervenience philosophically useful?